Name: Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection (Economic Learning and Social Evolution) (en Inglés)
Price: 180387.00 COP
Availability: InStock
Author: Larry Samuelson
ISBN: 9780262692199

portada Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection (Economic Learning and Social Evolution) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Mit Pr

Autor

Larry Samuelson

Año

1998

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

328

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Peso

1.00

ISBN

0262692198

ISBN13

9780262692199

Categorías

Teoría y filosofía de la economía

Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection (Economic Learning and Social Evolution) (en Inglés)

Larry Samuelson (Autor) · Mit Pr · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection (Economic Learning and Social Evolution) (en Inglés)"

The author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.