Name: Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake? And Other Essays (Stanford Series in Philosophy) (en Inglés)
Price: 615379.00 COP
Availability: InStock
Author: Howard Wettstein
ISBN: 9780804718660

portada Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake? And Other Essays (Stanford Series in Philosophy) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Stanford University Press

Autor

Howard Wettstein

Año

1991

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

248

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

ISBN

0804718660

ISBN13

9780804718660

N° edición

Categorías

Derecho procesal penal

Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake? And Other Essays (Stanford Series in Philosophy) (en Inglés)

Howard Wettstein (Autor) · Stanford University Press · Tapa Dura

Libro Nuevo

$ 615.379

$ 1.025.632

Ahorras: $ 410.253

40% descuento

Envío normal

Origen: Estados Unidos (Costos de importación incluídos en el precio)

Se enviará desde nuestra bodega entre el Lunes 10 de Junio y el Lunes 24 de Junio.

Lo recibirás en cualquier lugar de Colombia entre 1 y 5 días hábiles luego del envío.

Reseña del libro "Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake? And Other Essays (Stanford Series in Philosophy) (en Inglés)"

The nature of reference, or the relation of a word to the object to which it refers, has been perhaps the dominant concern of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Extremely influential arguments by Gottlob Frege around the turn of the century convinced the large majority of philosophers that the meaning of a word must be distinguished from its referent, the former only providing some kind of direction for reaching the latter. In the last twenty years, this Fregean orthodoxy has been vigorously challenged by those who argue that certain important kinds of words, at least, refer directly without need of an intermediate meaning or sense. The essays in this volume record how a long-term study of Frege has persuaded the author that Frege's pivotal distinction between sense and reference, and his attendant philosophical views about language and thought, are unsatisfactory. Frege's perspective, he argues, imposes a distinctive way of thinking about semantics, specifically about the centrality of cognitive significance puzzles for semantics. Freed from Frege's perspective, we will no longer find it natural to think about semantics in this way.