Name: Information, Incentives and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy: A Microtheory of the Japanese Economy (en Inglés)
Price: 214866.00 COP
Availability: InStock
Author: Masahiko Aoki
ISBN: 9780521386814

portada Information, Incentives and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy: A Microtheory of the Japanese Economy (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Cambridge University Press

Autor

Masahiko Aoki

Año

1990

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

336

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

ISBN

0521386810

ISBN13

9780521386814

Categorías

Historia de la economía

Information, Incentives and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy: A Microtheory of the Japanese Economy (en Inglés)

Masahiko Aoki (Autor) · Cambridge University Press · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "Information, Incentives and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy: A Microtheory of the Japanese Economy (en Inglés)"

This book is not another parable of Japan's economic success; it provides rich and systematic descriptions of Japanese microeconomic institutions and interprets their workings in terms familiar to Western economists. A systematic, in-depth analysis of Japanese institutions of this kind has never been available before. In making his comparative analysis of the Japanese system, the author critically examines conventional notions about the microstructure of the market economy that have strongly shaped and influenced economists' approach to industrial organization. While these notions may constitute an appropriate foundation for the analysis of the highly market-oriented Western economies, the author has found that a more complete understanding of the Japanese economy requires us to broaden such "specific" notions. Topics include the internal information structure, incentive scheme, and capital structure of the Japanese firm; corporate and bureaucratic behavior from the viewpoint of bargaining game theory; subcontract design; functions of corporate grouping; the pattern of innovation; and the possible impacts of cultural factors.