Name: Non-Competition Interests in eu Antitrust Law: An Empirical Study of Article 101 Tfeu (Global Competition law and Economics Policy) (en Inglés)
Price: 555940.00 COP
Availability: InStock
Author: Brook, Or
ISBN: 9781108837606

portada Non-Competition Interests in eu Antitrust Law: An Empirical Study of Article 101 Tfeu (Global Competition law and Economics Policy) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

Or Brook

Editorial

Cambridge University Press

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

400

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

Dimensiones

22.9 x 15.2 x 3.2 cm

Peso

0.93 kg.

ISBN13

9781108837606

Categorías

Legislación antimonopolios
Derecho militar y defensa

Non-Competition Interests in eu Antitrust Law: An Empirical Study of Article 101 Tfeu (Global Competition law and Economics Policy) (en Inglés)

Or Brook (Autor) · Cambridge University Press · Tapa Dura

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Reseña del libro "Non-Competition Interests in eu Antitrust Law: An Empirical Study of Article 101 Tfeu (Global Competition law and Economics Policy) (en Inglés)"

This book is the first to empirically examine the role of non-competition interests (public policy) in the enforcement of the EU's prohibition on anti-competitive agreements. Based on an original quantitative and qualitative database of over 3,100 cases, this book records all of the public enforcement actions of Article 101 TFEU taken by the Commission, EU Courts, and the national competition authorities and courts of five representative Member States (France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, and the UK). The book not only exposes explicit tools in which non-competition interests played a role, but also sheds light on the "dark matter" of balancing, namely, invisible forms of balancing triggered by the institutional and procedural setup of the competition enforcers. Moreover, it contributes to the empirical-legal study of various other aspects of EU competition law enforcement, such as its objectives, the more economic approach, decentralized enforcement, and the functioning and success of Regulation 1/2003.