Name: The Judicial tug of War: How Lawyers, Politicians, and Ideological Incentives Shape the American Judiciary (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) (en Inglés)
Price: 240101.00 COP
Availability: InStock
Author: Bonica, Adam ; Sen, Maya
ISBN: 9781108841368

portada The Judicial tug of War: How Lawyers, Politicians, and Ideological Incentives Shape the American Judiciary (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) (en Inglés)

The Judicial tug of War: How Lawyers, Politicians, and Ideological Incentives Shape the American Judiciary (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

Maya Sen

Adam Bonica

Editorial

Cambridge University Press

Año

2020

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

334

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

Dimensiones

23.4 x 19.6 x 2.3 cm

Peso

0.64 kg.

ISBN13

9781108841368

Categorías

Estados unidos de américa
Política y gobierno
Potestades del gobierno/de la administración pública

The Judicial tug of War: How Lawyers, Politicians, and Ideological Incentives Shape the American Judiciary (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) (en Inglés)

Maya Sen (Autor) · Adam Bonica (Autor) · Cambridge University Press · Tapa Dura

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Reseña del libro "The Judicial tug of War: How Lawyers, Politicians, and Ideological Incentives Shape the American Judiciary (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) (en Inglés)"

Why have conservatives decried 'activist judges'? And why have liberals - and America's powerful legal establishment - emphasized qualifications and experience over ideology? This transformative text tackles these questions with a new framework for thinking about the nation's courts, 'the judicial tug of war', which not only explains current political clashes over America's courts, but also powerfully predicts the composition of courts moving forward. As the text demonstrates through novel quantitative analyses, a greater ideological rift between politicians and legal elites leads politicians to adopt measures that put ideology and politics front and center - for example, judicial elections. On the other hand, ideological closeness between politicians and the legal establishment leads legal elites to have significant influence on the selection of judges. Ultimately, the judicial tug of war makes one point clear: for good or bad, politics are critical to how judges are selected and whose interests they ultimately represent.