Name: CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS Proxy Advisory Firms' Role in Voting and Corporate Governance Practices (en Inglés)
Price: 102909.00 COP
Availability: InStock
Author: Accountability Office, U. S. Government
ISBN: 9781542978354

portada CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS Proxy Advisory Firms' Role in Voting and Corporate Governance Practices (en Inglés)

CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS Proxy Advisory Firms' Role in Voting and Corporate Governance Practices (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Createspace

Autor

Accountability Office, U. S. Government

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

28.0 x 21.6 x 0.3 cm

Peso

0.14 kg.

ISBN13

9781542978354

Categorías

Derecho mercantil, de sociedades y de la competencia
Derecho mercantil. derecho financiero

CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS Proxy Advisory Firms' Role in Voting and Corporate Governance Practices (en Inglés)

Accountability Office, U. S. Government (Autor) · Createspace · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS Proxy Advisory Firms' Role in Voting and Corporate Governance Practices (en Inglés)"

Institutional investors, such as pension plans and mutual funds, hire proxy advisory firms to obtain research and vote recommendations on issues, such as executive compensation and proposed mergers that are addressed at shareholder meetings of public corporations (corporate issuers). Market participants and other stakeholders with whom GAO spoke agreed that with the increased demand for their services, proxy advisory firms' influence on shareholder voting and corporate governance practices has increased. But recent studies, market participants, and stakeholders had mixed views about the extent of the influence. For example, some said influence can vary based on institutional investor size (there is less influence on large institutional investors that often perform research in-house and have their own voting policies).