Name: Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (International Perspectives in Philosophy & Psychiatry) (en Inglés)
Price: 379404.00 COP
Availability: InStock
Author: Lisa Bortolotti
ISBN: 9780199206162

portada Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (International Perspectives in Philosophy & Psychiatry) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Oup Oxford

Autor

Lisa Bortolotti

Año

2010

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

299

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Peso

1.10

ISBN

9780199206162

ISBN13

9780199206162

N° edición

Categorías

Psiquiatría

Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (International Perspectives in Philosophy & Psychiatry) (en Inglés)

Lisa Bortolotti (Autor) · Oup Oxford · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (International Perspectives in Philosophy & Psychiatry) (en Inglés)"

Delusions are a common symptom of schizophrenia and dementia. Though most English dictionaries define a delusion as a false opinion or belief, there is currently a lively debate about whether delusions are really beliefs and indeed, whether they are even irrational. The book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of delusions. It brings together the psychological literature on the aetiology and the behavioural manifestations of delusions, and the philosophical literature on belief ascription and rationality. The thesis of the book is that delusions are continuous with ordinary beliefs, a thesis that could have important theoretical and practical implications for psychiatric classification and the clinical treatment of subjects with delusions. By bringing together recent work in philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology and psychiatry, the book offers a comprehensive review of the philosophical issues raised by the psychology of normal and abnormal cognition, defends the doxastic conception of delusions, and develops a theory about the role of judgements of rationality and of attributions of self-knowledge in belief ascription. Presenting a highly original analysis of the debate on the nature of delusions, this book will interest philosophers of mind, epistemologists, philosophers of science, cognitive scientists, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals.