Name: Multimarket Contact and Imperfect Information (en Inglés)
Price: 66958.00 COP
Availability: InStock
Author: Penny Hill Press Inc ; Federal Trade Commission
ISBN: 9781523326631

portada Multimarket Contact and Imperfect Information (en Inglés)

Multimarket Contact and Imperfect Information (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Ilustrado por

Penny Hill Press Inc

Editorial

Createspace

Autor

Penny Hill Press Inc ; Federal Trade Commission

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

28.0 x 21.6 x 0.2 cm

Peso

0.10 kg.

ISBN13

9781523326631

Categorías

Inversiones y títulos valores

Multimarket Contact and Imperfect Information (en Inglés)

Penny Hill Press Inc (Ilustrado por) · Createspace · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "Multimarket Contact and Imperfect Information (en Inglés)"

With perfect information about relevant strategic variables, economic theory predicts that firms engaged in competition across several markets sometimes can use their multimarket contact to blunt competitive forces. In practice, perfect information likely is not available, and it is well known that the existence of imperfect information can impede firms' collusive efforts. I extend a standard oligopoly supergame to examine simultaneously the effects of imperfect information and multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain, and I reach the following conclusions. First, linkage of one market with perfect information and another with imperfect information may not increase profits, despite the slack in incentive constraints exploited in perfect information models. Second, multimarket contact does not increase profits if each market has too little uncertainty. Third, profits can be increased in a market in which some collusion initially is sustainable by linking it with a market in which no collusion initially is sustainable. The central theme of these results is that a market must generate sufficiently noisy signals for it to benefit another market through strategic linkage. This contrasts with the finding in individual markets that collusion decreases as the level of noise increases.