Name: Sensations Hardback: A Defense of Type Materialism (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy) (en Inglés)
Price: 422820.00 COP
Availability: InStock
Author: Hill, Christopher S.
ISBN: 9780521394239

portada Sensations Hardback: A Defense of Type Materialism (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy) (en Inglés)

Sensations Hardback: A Defense of Type Materialism (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

Christopher S. Hill

Editorial

Cambridge University Press

Año

1991

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

264

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

Dimensiones

21.6 x 14.0 x 1.9 cm

Peso

0.49 kg.

ISBN

0521394236

ISBN13

9780521394239

Categorías

Filosofía humanista
Filosofía: lógica

Sensations Hardback: A Defense of Type Materialism (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy) (en Inglés)

Christopher S. Hill (Autor) · Cambridge University Press · Tapa Dura

Libro Nuevo Importado

Envío: 12 a 16 días háb.

$ 768.763$ 422.820

-45%

Costos de importación incluídos en el precio ✅

Libro Nuevo

Quedan más de 100 unidades

$ 422.820

¡Envío Gratis! Llega entre el 27 Ago y el 03 Sep a Bogota, Cundinamarca. Seleccionar ubicación

Agregar a lista de deseos

Reseña del libro "Sensations Hardback: A Defense of Type Materialism (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy) (en Inglés)"

This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theories (dualism, double aspect theory, eliminative materialism, functionalism), and explores a number of important issues: the forms and limits of introspective awareness of sensations, the semantic properties of sensory concepts, knowledge of other minds, and unity of consciousness. The book is a significant contribution to the philosophy of mind, and has much to say to psychologists and cognitive scientists.