Name: Tip-Toeing Through the Tulips With Congress: How Congressional Attention Constrains Covert Action (Elements in International Relations) (en Inglés)
Price: 300217.00 COP
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Author: Dani Kaufmann Nedal; Madison V. Schramm
ISBN: 9781009598002

portada Tip-Toeing Through the Tulips With Congress: How Congressional Attention Constrains Covert Action (Elements in International Relations) (en Inglés)

Tip-Toeing Through the Tulips With Congress: How Congressional Attention Constrains Covert Action (Elements in International Relations) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Cambridge University Press

Autor

Dani Kaufmann Nedal; Madison V. Schramm

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

ISBN13

9781009598002

Tip-Toeing Through the Tulips With Congress: How Congressional Attention Constrains Covert Action (Elements in International Relations) (en Inglés)

Dani Kaufmann Nedal; Madison V. Schramm (Autor) · Cambridge University Press · Tapa Dura

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Reseña del libro "Tip-Toeing Through the Tulips With Congress: How Congressional Attention Constrains Covert Action (Elements in International Relations) (en Inglés)"

Over the years, the US has intervened covertly in many countries to remove dictators, subvert elected leaders, and support coups. Explanations for this focus on characteristics of target countries or strategic incentives to pursue regime change. This Element provides an account of domestic political factors constraining US presidents' authorization of covert foreign-imposed regime change operations (FIRCs), arguing that congressional attention to covert action alters the Executive's calculus by increasing the political costs associated with this secretive policy instrument. It shows that congressional attention is the result of institutional battles over abuses of executive authority and has a significant constraining effect independent of codified rules and partisan disputes. These propositions are tested using content analysis of the Congressional Record, statistical analysis of Cold War covert FIRCs, and causal-process evidence relating to covert interventions in Chile, Angola, Central America, Afghanistan, etc.