Name: the effects of agency problems on the financial behavior, performance, and efficiency of german industrial stock corporations (en Inglés)
Price: 471508.00 COP
Availability: InStock
Author: Wolf, J. Benedict
ISBN: 9783631345740

portada the effects of agency problems on the financial behavior, performance, and efficiency of german industrial stock corporations (en Inglés)

the effects of agency problems on the financial behavior, performance, and efficiency of german industrial stock corporations (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

J. Benedict Wolf

Editorial

Peter Lang Gmbh, Internationaler Verlag Der W

Año

1999

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

411

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

20.8 x 14.7 x 3.6 cm

Peso

0.52 kg.

ISBN

3631345747

ISBN13

9783631345740

Categorías

Contabilidad de gestión y teneduría de libros
Finanzas
Historia de empresas específicas/historia societaria

the effects of agency problems on the financial behavior, performance, and efficiency of german industrial stock corporations (en Inglés)

J. Benedict Wolf (Autor) · Peter Lang Gmbh, Internationaler Verlag Der W · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "the effects of agency problems on the financial behavior, performance, and efficiency of german industrial stock corporations (en Inglés)"

Using a catalog of seven agency problem identifier variables such as block ownership and market segment traded in, 237 German industrial stock corporations are analyzed for the time period 1986-1992. Five sectors are also analyzed separately. Agency-problem related differences in financial behavior, performance, and cost efficiency are tested for using t-tests for mean differences and logistic regressions. The cost efficiency is estimated via stochastic maximum likelihood frontier functions. Manager-controlled firms prefer free cash flows as predicted. Owners favor debt and avoid new stock issues. Contrary to theory, manager-controlled companies do not show a poorer performance than owner-controlled firms. They do, however, operate more inefficiently than firms controlled by owners.