Name: The Governance Cycle in Parliamentary Democracies: A Computational Social Science Approach (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) (en Inglés)
SKU: 54501071
Price: 161277.00 COP
Availability: InStock
Author: de Marchi, Scott ; Laver, Michael
ISBN: 9781009315487

portada The Governance Cycle in Parliamentary Democracies: A Computational Social Science Approach (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) (en Inglés)

The Governance Cycle in Parliamentary Democracies: A Computational Social Science Approach (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

Scott de Marchi

Michael Laver

Editorial

Cambridge University Press

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

200

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

22.9x15.2x1.3 cm

Peso

0.34 kg.

ISBN13

9781009315487

Categorías

Política y gobierno

The Governance Cycle in Parliamentary Democracies: A Computational Social Science Approach (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) (en Inglés)

Scott de Marchi (Autor) · Michael Laver (Autor) · Cambridge University Press · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "The Governance Cycle in Parliamentary Democracies: A Computational Social Science Approach (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) (en Inglés)"

Parliamentary democracy involves a never-ending cycle of elections, government formations, and the need for governments to survive in potentially hostile environments. These conditions require members of any government to make decisions on a large number of issues, some of which sharply divide them. Officials resolve these divisions by 'logrolling'- conceding on issues they care less about, in exchange for reciprocal concessions on issues to which they attach more importance. Though realistically modeling this 'governance cycle' is beyond the scope of traditional formal analysis, this book attacks the problem computationally in two ways. Firstly, it models the behavior of "functionally rational" senior politicians who use informal decision heuristics to navigate their complex high stakes setting. Secondly, by applying computational methods to traditional game theory, it uses artificial intelligence to model how hyper-rational politicians might find strategies that are close to optimal.